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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANDREW D. MOENCH,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20030382-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging
his conviction for aggravated assault with a "gang enhancement/' a second degree
felony.1 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did State v. Lopes prevent the imposition of a gang enhancement based upon
petitioner's guilty plea in which he admitted committing an aggravated assault while
acting in concert with at least two other individuals?

Although the statute is more accurately referred to as the "group criminal
activity" enhancement, Utah Courts commonly refer to it as the "gang enhancement."
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 2 n.l, 980 P.2d 191 {"Lopes"). Therefore, the State will
use the more common terminology to refer to the statute.

2. Where the record demonstrates that petitioner understood the elements of both
aggravated assault and the gang enhancement, and also admitted facts that satisfied those
elements, did petitioner knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty?
3 Did petitioner's trial counsel provide effective assistance?
Standard of Review: A single standard of review applies to all three issues. This
Court reviews "an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for postconviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of
law " Rudolph v Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 43 P 3d 467
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1
(Supp. 1999), the version of the gang enhancement statute in effect when petitioner pled
guilty and was sentenced m 1999. Its full text is reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEiMENT OF THE CASE
On 5 November 1998 the State charged petitioner with one count of murder, a first
degree felony. R. 152-55, 262. The information noted that the murder charge was
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (the gang
enhancement statute), because petitioner committed the crime in concert with two or
more persons. Id. On 20 October 1999 petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated
assault, a second degree felony, committed in concert with two or more persons. R. 16168, 177-78, 264. The trial court sentenced petitioner to serve six-to-fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison. R. 245-46, 268.
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On 15 February 2001 petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1.
The post-conviction court reviewed the merits of petitioner's claims, found them
unpersuasive, and dismissed the petition as frivolous. R. 112-14; Moench v. State, 2002
UT App 333, *[ 3, 57 P.3d 1116. This Court reversed, finding that the post-conviction
court erred by reaching the merits of the petition, rather than simply determining whether
the petition was frivolous on its face. Moench, 2002 UT App 333, f 14.
On 4 December 2002, following remand, the post-conviction court ordered the
State to respond to the petition. R. 128. The State filed a response arguing that each of
petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law. R. 134-246. After oral argument, the postconviction court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying the
petition. R. 261-274, a copy of this document is attached as Addendum B. Petitioner
timely appealed. R. 278.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Underlying Crimes
Petitioner, a member of the "Straight Edge" gang, together with several fellow
gang members, became involved in a fight with another group of young men including
Bernardo Repreza. R. 262, Add. B. During the fight, Jason Cunningham and petitioner
chased Repreza while Sean Darger yelled to the two to "get him.,, Id. Cunningham
struck Repreza with an expandible police baton causing Repreza to fall. Id. Petitioner
then hit Repreza several times in the head with either a baseball bat or a large piece of
wood, seriously injuring Repreza. Id. As Repreza lay unconscious from the beating,
Collin Ressor stabbed him in the abdomen. Id.
3

Medical evidence presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrated that Repreza
died from the stab wound, rather than the blows that petitioner inflicted to his head. R.
211-13, 263. Nevertheless, petitioner's beating rendered Repreza unconscious, giving
Ressor the opportunity to stab and kill Repreza. R. 263.
The Plea Agreement
The State originally charged petitioner with murder, a first degree felony, subject
to a gang enhancement. R. 152-55, 262 (Add. B). The State eventually made a plea
offer, agreeing to reduce the charge to aggravated assault, a second degree felony, still
subject to a gang enhancement. R. 168, 264 (Add B). The State also agreed that if the
Court sentenced petitioner to prison, the State would remain silent on a motion to reduce
the degree of the offense to a third degree felony. R. 168, 264 (Add. B).
Petitioner's Plea Affidavit
On 20 October 1999 petitioner accepted the State's plea offer and pled guilty to
committing an aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons. R. 161-68, 180205, 264-267 (Add. B). Petitioner's plea affidavit set forth the elements of petitioner's
crime as, "[t]he actor commits an assault and intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another. He does so in concert with two or more other people." R. 161, 265 (Add. B).
Petitioner admitted the following facts in his plea affidavit:
"[m]y conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: On
31 October 1998, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I intentionally struck Bernard
Repreza in the head with a club. According to Dr. Leis, this resulted in
serious bodily injury. Immediately prior to my striking him, Jason
Cunningham struck him with a baton. We had been urged to chase and 'get
him' by a third person/'
4

R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B).
Petitioner also stated in his affidavit, "I know that if I wish to contest the charge
against me, I need only plead 'not guilty' and the matter will be set for tnal. At the tnal
the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt." R. 163, 265 (Add. B). He further declared, "I have read this
statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I understand its provisions I
know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this affidavit. I do not wish
to make any changes because all of the statements are correct/' R 164, 265 (Add. B)
The Plea Colloquy
Petitioner was represented by Mr. Edward Brass. R. 184. In responding to the
tnal court's questions regarding whether petitioner understood the charges against him
and his constitutional nghts, Mr. Brass referred the tnal court to petitioner's plea
affidavit R. 185-86. Mr. Brass informed the tnal court that petitioner had read his plea
affidavit and did not have any questions about it. R. 186. He also told the tnal court that
he was certain petitioner understood the affidavit. R. 186, 265 (Add. B). Mr Brass also
explained that petitioner had signed the plea affidavit in his presence. R. 192.
The tnal court then asked petitioner whether he intended to plead guilty to the
"second amended information charging you with an aggravated assault with a gang
enhancement." R. 186-87, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes." R. 187, 266 (Add.
B) Petitioner also assured the tnal court that he understood the aggravated assault and
gang enhancement charges in the second amended information. R. 187. The tnal court

5

also questioned petitioner about his physical and mental state and reviewed with him the
constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty. R. 187-88, 266 (Add. B).
The Court then asked Mr. Brass to state the factual basis of the plea and added,
"obviously the factual statement will include each and every element of the offense as
charged:' R. 188-89, 266 (Add. B). Mr. Brass replied, "It does." Id.
Mr. Brass then read the factual basis as admitted by petitioner in his plea affidavit.
R. 189, 266 (Add. B). The trial court then inquired of petitioner whether those facts were
true. R. 190, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes, your Honor" Id.
The trial court then asked, "by admitting and pleading guilty to the charge . ..
you're admitting each and every element of the offense. Do you understand that?" R.
190, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. Petitioner also confirmed that he
understood that the gang enhancement increased the maximum sentence that could be
imposed to six-to-fifteen years. Id.
The trial court then asked petitioner, "how do you plead to the charge of
Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree, a Felony with a gang enhancement; guilty or
not guilty?" R. 192, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Guilty." Id.
Based on petitioner's admissions in his plea affidavit and during the colloquy, the
trial court specifically found that "this charge was done in connection with two or more
persons," and "therefore, the gang enhancement is appropriate." R. 193-94, 267 (Add.
B). The trial court accepted petitioner's plea, finding that he entered it "freely,
voluntarily and knowingly." R. 194, 267 (Add. B).
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Regarding the Enhancement
Following petitioner's plea, the trial court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the enhancement. R. 157-59, 267 (Add B) The findings
state that petitioner "admitted facts in support of the plea including that he acted in
concert with two other persons." R. 157, 267 (Add. B). The findings also state that "[a]s
Cunningham and [petitioner] chased Repreza, Sean Darger, another "Straight-Edge"
member, yelled at the two, "get him." R. 158. The findings continued, "[Petitioner],
Cunningham and Darger each had the mental state required for commission of the assault
on Repreza." R. 158, 267 (Add. B).
The trial court imposed a gang enhancement at sentencing, resulting in a sentence
of six-to-fifteen years in prison. R. 245-46, 268 (Add. B).
The Post-Conviction Proceedings
Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging:
a) That Mr. Brass was ineffective because he:
1) failed to move to reduce the degree of
petitioner's offense, despite his promise to do
so;
2) failed to object to the imposition of a gang
enhancement at sentencing; and
3) failed to act in petitioner's best interest when
he encouraged petitioner to accept the plea
offer, rather than going to tnal on a murder
charge;
b) Petitioner's plea was not knowingly entered because:
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1) he was not informed of the elements of the gang
enhancement or that the State was required to prove
the elements of the enhancement; and
2) the factual basis to support his plea to the gang
enhancement was insufficient pursuant to State v.
Lopes,
c) The gang enhancement statute was unconstitutional;
d) The trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence petitioner when
it failed to impose sentence within forty-five days of the entry
of his plea.
R. 7-8. The State responded that each of petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law. R.
134-246.
The post-conviction court set the matter for oral argument. R. 247. At that
hearing, petitioner conceded that he was not entitled to relief on his claims that Mr. Brass
was ineffective for failing to move to reduce the degree of his offense, and that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. R. 269 (Add. B); 284: 3,12. Petitioner also
proffered that his father was prepared to testify "that neither he nor the petitioner
understood the plea and therefore . . . the plea was not voluntarily entered into." R. 284:
8. Petitioner also proffered that he would testify that he did not understand the plea. Id.
Following the parties' arguments, the post-conviction court stated that it tended to
agree with the State's position and was prepared to rule based upon the pleadings, but
would set the matter for an evidentiary hearing if petitioner so desired. R. 270 (Add. B);
284: 24-25. After consulting with petitioner, however, his counsel explained they had
concluded that "it was not in petitioner's interest to have an evidentiary hearing." Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Petitioner misreads State v. Lopes to hold that the gang enhancement can
never be imposed based solely upon a defendant's guilty plea. He contends that under
Lopes, the enhancement can only be applied if the criminal liability of the other %'in
concert" actors is established either at a trial or by their pleas to identical crimes.
Petitioner is mistaken.
State v. Lopes held that a defendant has the right to have a jury decide whether the
State has proven the elements of the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lopes recognized, however, that a defendant could waive his right to a jury trial by
pleading guilty to the enhancement. The enhancement was improperly imposed in Lopes
because the defendant entered a carefully worded conditional plea which did not admit
the elements of the enhancement. Lopes explicitly recognizes, however, that the
enhancement may be applied if a defendant admits the elements of the enhancement as
part of his guilty plea.
Point II. Petitioner's allegation that the trial court violated rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in taking his plea, and that his plea was insufficient to justify
imposition of the enhancement, is based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes. Even if
petitioner could demonstrate a violation of Rule 11, that would not entitled petitioner to
collateral post-conviction relief. In any event, his claim fails because it is based upon his
misunderstanding of Lopes.
Furthermore, the record of petitioner's plea demonstrates that he understood the
elements of both the aggravated assault and the gang enhancement, and that he admitted
9

these elements as part of his guilty plea. Petitioner affirmatively waived the upportunity
to present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly
held that petitioner's plea was validly entered and was sufficient to justify imposition of
the gang enhancement.
Point III. Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him
to plead guilty to the enhancement is also based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes.
Therefore, this claim fails.
The post-conviction court also correctly held that petitioner's counsel was not
ineffective for advising petitioner to accept the State's plea offer rather than go to trial.
Because the evidence could have supported a murder conviction, the benefits of the
State's offer outweighed the risks of going to trial.
ARGUMENT
I. STATE V. LOPES DOES NOT PREVENT THE IMPOSITION OF
A GANG ENHANCEMENT BASED SOLELY UPON A
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA2
Petitioner argues that the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v Lopes, 1999
UT 24, % 17, 980 P.2d 191, declaring a portion of the gang enhancement statute
unconstitutional, prevented the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement based
solely upon petitioner's guilty plea. Br. Aplt. at 15-20. Petitioner contends that absent a
tnal establishing the culpability of the other "in concert" actors, or evidence that those
actors pled guilty to identical crimes, the State could not impose the enhancement. Br.
2

Although this point responds to petitioner's third issue, his first two issues
cannot be resolved without resolving this issue; therefore, the State addresses this issue
first.
10

Aplt. at 17-18. Petitioner's claim fails because Lopes recognizes that a guilty plea in
which a defendant admits the elements of the gang enhancement provides a sufficient
basis for imposition of the enhancement. See 1999 UT 24 at Iff 17, 22.
The gang enhancement statute provides an increased penalty for certain crimes if
committed "in concert with two or more persons." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1
(l)(a). To be guilty of acting "in concert," the actors "must (i) have possessed a mental
state sufficient to commit the same underlying offense and (ii) have directly committed
the underlying offense or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally
aided one of the other two actors to engage in conduct constituting the underlying
offense." Lopes, 1999 UT 24 atf 8.
As originally drafted, section (5)(c) of the enhancement statute allowed a
sentencing judge, rather than a jury to impose the gang enhancement if he found the
requirements of the statute satisfied. The section stated:
The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose
the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the penalty is
contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
§ 76-3-203.l(5)(c)(Supp. 1999).
In Lopes, the Utah Supreme Court found section (5)(c) to be unconstitutional.
1999 UT 24 at ^ 22. The Court reasoned that the enhancement statute "created a specific
new crime," the elements of which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at %
15. As with any other crime, a defendant has a right to have a jury decide whether the
State had satisfied its burden of proof. Id. at ^f 16. Because section (5)(c), as originally
11

drafted, allowed a sentencing judge to determine whether the elements of the
enhancement were proven, the section violated a defendant's right to a jury trial under the
Utah Constitution. Id. at f 17. Consequently, the Court found section (5)(c)
unconstitutional, but found "the remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute
constitutional." Id. at 20.
In entering his guilty plea, the defendant in Lopes was careful not to admit the
elements of the enhancement. See 1999 UT 24 at f 4 n.3. Lopes entered a conditional
plea and "never conceded that all the elements of the enhancement statue were satisfied,
i.e., that the other individuals shared the requisite mental state for murder." Id.
Therefore, Lopes' carefully worded plea "did not establish all of the elements of the
enhancement offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at Tj 17.
Petitioner relies upon this language in Lopes to argue that a guilty plea can never
establish the elements of the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 17. Petitioner claims that under
Lopes, an enhancement can never be applied unless a trial establishes the criminal
liability of the "in concert" actors, or the actors plead guilty to an identical crime. Id.
Petitioner misunderstands Lopes.
Contrary to petitioner's reading, Lopes effectively recognizes that an enhancement
can be imposed based upon a guilty plea that admits the elements of the enhancement.
See 1999 UT 24 at ff 17, 22. The enhancement was improperly applied to Lopes
because "[t]he elements of the crime were not established against Lopes, either by his
plea or by a jury trial." Id. at f 22 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court acknowledged that
Lopes' plea could have been sufficient to justify the imposition of the enhancement, had
12

he admitted the necessary elements See id at 1fl[ 17, 22 Moreover, the Court recognized
that a guilty plea to the enhancement would waive the State's burden of proving the
elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. See id at f 17 ("absent waiver,
only a jury has the ability to determine when elements of a crime are established beyond
a reasonable doubt").
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's observation that Lopes' plea "did not
establish the requisite mental state of the other actors," Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 17,
petitioner infers a general rule of law that "[o]ne person cannot enter a plea which
establishes the mens rea of another." Br Aplt. at 17 The Court's observation in Lopes,
however, did not established such a rule. Rather, the Court simply observed, based on
the facts of Lopes' carefully worded conditional plea, that he did not admit that he acted
in concert with the other actors.
Unlike Lopes' conditional plea in which he refused to admit the elements of the
enhancement, petitioner entered an unconditional plea admitting that he committed an
aggravated assault "in concert with two or more people." R. 161 As discussed more
thoroughly below, petitioner's plea admitted the elements of both the aggravated assault
and the gang enhancement. Therefore, the enhancement was properly imposed based
upon petitioner's plea.
II. PETITIONER'S PLEA WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARILY
ENTERED
Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was invalid because (1) the trial court failed
to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure by ensuring that he
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understood the elements of his crime; and (2) his plea was insufficient to establish the
"factual basis'1 for imposing the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 11-13, 17-20. The postconviction court correctly found, however, that neither claim justified relief.
A. Even if the trial court violated Rule 11 in taking petitioner's
guilty plea, the error would be insufficient to entitle petitioner to
relief.
Petitioner contends that his plea was invalidly entered because the trial court did
not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by ensuring that he
understood the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. Br. Aplt. at 11-12.
However, evidence that a trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 when taking a
guilty plea is, in itself, insufficient to entitle a petitioner to post-conviction relief. See
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). To obtain relief, a post-conviction
petitioner must demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. See id.; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-104 (2002). "Compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally required."
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Therefore, "a petitioner must show more than a violation of the
prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact
not knowing and voluntary." Id. at 992.
The United States Supreme Court announced the constitutional requirements for a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
Under Boykin, a defendant must understand that his guilty plea will waive (1) his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) his right to trial by jury, and (3) his
right to confront his accusers. Id. at 243. Additionally, a guilty plea "'cannot be truly
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voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts '" Id at 243 n 5 (quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U S. 458, 466 (1938))
Petitioner argues that he did not understand the elements of his crime because the
trial court failed to inform him dunng the plea colloquy that the gang enhancement could
not be imposed unless the State had "already conclusively established accomplice
liability." Br Aplt. at 13. As discussed above, however, the State was not required to
establish the criminal liability of the other "in concert" actors in a separate proceeding.
See Point I, above. Rather, the enhancement could be imposed based solely upon
petitioner's guilty plea, provided the he admitted the elements of the enhancement. See
id , Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ffl| 17, 22. Therefore, because petitioner's claim that the plea
colloquy was inadequate is based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes, the claim fails.
B. Petitioner understood that he was pleading guilty to committing
an enhanced crime.
Petitioner also claims that his plea was invalid because it failed to establish the
factual basis for the gang enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 13-15. He argues that under Lopes,
the factual basis for the enhancement could only be established by a separate adjudication
of his cohort's guilt. Id, Again, petitioner's claim fails because it is based upon his
misunderstanding of Lopes. Furthermore, the record of petitioner's plea demonstrates his
understanding that by pleading guilty he would be admitting the elements of both
aggravated assault and the gang enhancement.
A court conducting a collateral review of a guilty plea is not "is not limited to the
record of the plea hearing but may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances,
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including the information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering
the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. The entire record of petitioner's plea demonstrates
that he understood he was pleading guilty to an enhanced crime.
Petitioner's plea affidavit recited the elements of both aggravated assault and the
gang enhancement. R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B). Petitioner admitted facts that satisfied
those elements including that he committed an aggravated assault in concert with
Cunningham, who beat the victim with an expandable police baton, and Darger who
encouraged both Cunningham and Darger to uget" the victim. R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B).
Mr. Brass assured the trial court that he understood the contents of his plea affidavit. R.
185, 265 (Add. B). Mr. Brass also clarified that the gang enhancement was "included as
part of the plea" and assured the trial court that he had explained the charges to petitioner.
R.185.
During his plea colloquy, petitioner twice assured the trial court that he understood
that by pleading guilty to the enhanced charge, he was admitting each and every element
of the enhanced offense. R. 189-90, 266 (Add. B). Furthermore, the trial court took care
to ensure that petitioner understood he was pleading guilty not just to aggravated assault,
but to the enhancement as well. R. 192, 266 (Add. B).
Petitioner affirmatively waived his opportunity to present evidence that would
contradict the record of his plea. Although petitioner alleged he had evidence that would
demonstrate that he did not understand the elements of his enhanced crime, he declined
the post-conviction court's invitation to hold a hearing where he could introduce this
evidence. R. 270 (Add. B), 284:25. Consequently, petitioner failed to carry his burden
16

of proving that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and the post-conviction court
correctly denied his claim.
C. None of the additional challenges that petitioner raises establish
that his plea was invalid.
Petitioner also claims that additional alleged defects in his plea rendered it invalid
and unable to support imposition of the gang enhancement. None of his alleged defects
withstand scrutiny.
Petitioner claims that the initial failure to identify Sean Darger as the individual
encouraging petitioner to "get" the victim, and Darger's eventual acquittal of murder,
demonstrate that the State had not, and allegedly could not establish Darger's culpability
sufficient to justify imposition of the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 13-15, 19-20. However,
as discussed above, the State was not required to establish the culpability of petitioner's
cohorts in a separate proceeding. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ff 17, 22. Rather,
petitioner's plea waived the State's burden to prove Darger's culpability. See id. In any
event, Darger's acquittal of murder does not establish that, absent petitioner's plea, the
State could not have convicted Darger of aggravated assault.3

Nor does Darger's acquittal of murder undermine the factual basis of
petitioner's plea. To satisfy the factual basis requirement, "the record must reveal either
facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest
a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666,
672 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Although Darger was acquitted of murder after petitioner
entered his plea, R. 262, Darger could have been convicted as an accomplice to
aggravated assault by encouraging petitioner and Cunningham to "get" the victim.
Therefore, the State had evidence suggesting that petitioner faced "a substantial risk of
conviction at trial" for both an aggravated assault and the gang enhancement. See
Stilling, 856P.2dat672.
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Petitioner also claims that the tnal court should have required him to enter
separate pleas to the aggravated assault charge and the enhancement, rather than a single
plea to an enhanced crime, because the enhancement is a separate offense. Br. Aplt. at
13. However, petitioner cites no authonty for this claim. See id. Furthermore, the record
demonstrates that petitioner understood he was pleading to both the underlying charge
and the enhancement. The tnal court asked petitioner "how do you plead to the charge of
Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree, a Felony with a gang enhancement; guilty or
not guilty?" R. 192, 266 (Add B) (emphasis added). Thus, although petitioner entered a
single plea, it is clear that he understood that his plea was an admission of both the
underlying cnme and the enhancement.
Petitioner also claims that because he entered a single plea, this Court cannot
simply vacate the enhancement, but must vacate his entire plea. Br. Aplt. at 15. Because
petitioner has not demonstrated any error in his plea there is no need to vacate
petitioner's conviction for the aggravated assault or the gang enhancement. Even if there
were some error in petitioner's plea to the enhancement, however, that would not require
vacating his plea to the aggravated assault. As discussed above, petitioner understood he
was pleading guilty to both the aggravated assault and the enhancement. Therefore, the
Court could vacate the enhancement without disturbing petitioner's plea to the
aggravated assault.
III.

MR. BRASS PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Finally, petitioner claims that Mr. Brass provided ineffective assistance (1) by
allowing him to plea guilty to the enhanced charge despite the holding in State v Lopes\
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and (2) by encouraging him to accept the State's plea offer, rather than going to trial on
the murder charge. Br. Aplt. 7-11. Petitioner's first allegation fails because it is based
upon his misunderstanding of Lopes. His second allegation fails because Mr. Brass's
advice was objectively reasonable.
A. Mr. Brass was not ineffective for allowing petitioner to plead
guilty to the enhancement in light of Lopes.
Petitioner claimed that Mr. Brass was ineffective because he uwas on notice that
the gang enhancement had been struck down as unconstitutional and otherwise
inapplicable to the Petitioner's plea, but failed to object to the enhancement and allowed
the Petitioner's conviction to be unlawfully entered and enhanced." R. 7. Therefore,
petitioner's claim is based upon his misunderstanding that Lopes required the State to
establish the culpability of petitioner's cohorts in a separate proceeding before petitioner
could plead guilty to the enhanced charge. Br. Aplt. at 6-8. Had Lopes actually held as
petitioner contends, then Mr. Brass would have been ineffective for failing allowing
petitioner to enter his plea. As discussed above, however, Lopes did not require the State
to establish the culpability of petitioner's cohorts in a separate proceeding prior to
petitioner's plea. Therefore, Mr. Brass was not ineffective for allowing petitioner to
plead to aggravated assault and the enhancement.
B. Mr. Brass's advice to accept the plea offer, rather than go to
trial on a murder charge was objectively reasonable.
Petitioner also claims that Mr. Brass was ineffective for encouraging him to accept
the State's plea offer. Based upon "the preliminary findings that [petitioner's] actions
was not the cause of death to the victim," he reasons that "it would have been impossible
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for a reasonable jury to have concluded that he was guilty of murder." Br. Aplt. at 7. He
also claims that "in retrospect," Sean Darger's subsequent acquittal on a murder charge
for the same incident demonstrates the unlikelihood that the State could have convicted
petitioner of murder. Id. at 8. Petitioner's claim fails because petitioner could have been
convicted as an accomplice to murder. Furthermore, his claim is precisely the type of
hindsight second-guessing that the United States Supreme Court prohibited in evaluating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must meet the
two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted
by Utah courts in Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). Petitioner must
establish that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, petitioner must demonstrate that
counsels' "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In evaluating this prong, a court cannot second-guess
counsels' legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those choices might
appear in retrospect. Id. at 689. Moreover, a court must make every effort to "eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight" and "to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time." Id.
To satisfy the second, or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, petitioner
must show that he was actually prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. This
requires a showing that absent counsel's errors there is a reasonable probability of a more
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favorable result. State v Simmons, 5 P 3d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct App 2000), Strickland,
466 U S at 694, 104 S Ct. at 2068. When a petitioner claims that his guilty plea resulted
from ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing
that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v Lockhart, 474 U S. 52,
57,59(1985).
The post-conviction court correctly found that Mr. Brass provided effective
assistance Mr. Brass did not encourage petitioner to plead guilty to a crime that no jury
would have convicted him of committing. Although the evidence would have shown that
petitioner did not directly cause the victim's death, petitioner could have been convicted
as an accomplice to murder. A person who possesses the requisite mental state and
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense" may be convicted of the offense as an
accomplice, even though they may not have directly committed the offense. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1999). As the post-conviction court observed, the beating
petitioner inflicted on the victim rendered the victim unconscious and gave Colin Ressor
the opportunity to stab and kill the victim. R. 263 (Add. B). Therefore, petitioner could
have been convicted of murder under the accomplice liability statute.
Moreover, accepting the plea offer provided petitioner significant benefits. In
addition to removing the risk of a murder conviction and a life sentence, petitioner's plea
also enhanced his chances for probation. Petitioner would only be convicted of a second,
rather than a first degree felony and could argue that he had accepted responsibility for
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his actions. Moreover, the plea offer gave petitioner the benefit of the State's agreement
to remain silent on his motion to reduce the degree of his offense to a third degree felony
In short, the risks of going to trial outweighed the benefits of the plea offer.
Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly found that Mr. Brass's advice to accept the
plea offer was not objectively unreasonable.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Sean Darger's subsequent acquittal of a murder
charge does not demonstrate that Mr. Brass unreasonably advised petitioner to accept the
State's plea offer As petitioner acknowledges, Darger was not tried for murder until
after petitioner accepted his plea. Br. Aplt. at 20. Because a court must make every
effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" and "to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, the outcome of Darger's
case should not be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of Mr. Brass's advice.
In any event, Darger's case provided a poor standard for predicting what would
have occurred had petitioner gone to trial on a murder charge. Having handled both
petitioner's and Darger's cases, the post-conviction court specifically rejected petitioner's
argument that Darger was at least as culpable, if not more culpable that petitioner. R. 262
(Add. B). Therefore, even if this Court were to apply the distorting effects of hindsight
and evaluate Mr. Brass's advice based on information that was unknown to him, the
outcome of Darger's case provides no support for petitioner's claim that Mr. Brass's
advice was unreasonable.
Additionally, the post-conviction court correctly denied this claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Mr
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Brass's allegedly deficient performance. Petitioner affirmatively waived his opportunity
to put on evidence demonstrating that, but for Mr. Brass's allegedly deficient
performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial. R. 270 (Add.
B). Therefore, petitioner's claim also fails for lack of prejudice.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.
Respectfully submitted this £>

day of November 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

76-3-203J. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection '4) m concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons participated as partieb to the
offense under Section 76-2-202.
ic) In determining if a convicted person committed an offense m concert
with two or more persons, the standard of proof applied by the sentencing3
judge shall be the preponderance of the evidence.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years m
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1.
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2,
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3,
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;

(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part I.
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76.
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3.
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) anyfraudoffense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510. 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518. and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3. Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307.
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508.
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) (i) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether
to impose the enhanced penalty under this section.
(ii) The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a finding by
the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence that this
section is applicable.
(iii) In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.
History: C. 1963,76-3-203.1, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 207, 3 1; 1994, ch. 12, S 108; 1999,
ch. 11, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection
(1Kb) substituted "participated" for "would be

criminally liable" making a minor stylistic
change; added Subsection (lWc/; divided Subsection (5Xc) adding the (i) to <u0 designations:
and added "'by a preponderance of the evidence"
m Subsection iSMcrtu).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANDREW D. MOENCH,
Petitioner,
v.

I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 010901454
Respondent.
Judge William W. Barrett

This matter came before the Court on 4 March 2003 for oral argument on petitioner's
petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act, and the State's response thereto.
Petitioner was present and appeared through counsel, Mr. Bruce A. Jacques. The State appeared
through counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the
petition, the supporting memorandum, and the State's response. The Court also heard argument
from counsel for both parties. Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court issues the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying the petition:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Crimes
1. Petitioner, a member of the "Straight Edge" gang, and several of his associates in the
gang, became involved in a fight with another group of young men including Bernardo Repreza.
Exhibit A at 3; Exhibit B at 2.1
2. During the fight, Jason Cunningham and petitioner chased Repreza while Sean Darger
yelled to the two to "get him." Exhibit B at 2. Cunningham struck Repreza with an expandible
police baton causing Repreza to fall. Id. Petitioner then hit Repreza several times in the head
with a baseball bat or other large piece of wood, seriously injuring Repreza. Exhibit A at 3;
Exhibit B at 2; Exhibit C 1-2. Collin Ressor then stabbed Repreza in the abdomen. Exhibit A at
3. Repreza died from the stab wound. Exhibit A at 4.
3. On 5 November 1998 the State charged petitioner with murder, a first degree felony.
Exhibit A at 1. It also sought to impose an enhanced penalty, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-3-203.1, because it alleged that petitioner committed the crime in concert with two or more
persons. Id.
4. This Court handled the criminal proceedings for both petitioner and Sean Darger.
5. Darger was acquitted of murder. Nevertheless, given the Court's recollection of the
facts of both cases, the Court rejects petitioner's contention that Darger was at least equally, if
not more culpable than petitioner, and that Darger's case provides a good comparison of what
would have happened had petitioner gone to trial on a murder charge.
1

All Exhibits are attached to the State's response to the petition.
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6. Although the blows that petitioner struck to Repreza's head did not cause Repreza's
death, petitioner beat Repreza until he was unconscious, giving Ressor the opportunity to stab
and kill Repreza.
Proceedings in the District Court
7. In district court, petitioner, represented by Mr. Ed Brass, moved to dismiss the murder
charge, or to quash the magistrate's order binding him over for trial. Exhibit D. Petitioner
argued that there was no evidence presented at his preliminary hearing that he participated in a
homicide, or that if such evidence was presented, it was insufficient to bind him over for trial.
Id
8. The Court denied the motion. Exhibit E.
9. Mr. Brass also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude as evidence, a videotape
recording of petitioner's interview with the staff of the 20/20 television news program. Exhibit
E.
10. The Court granted the motion, finding that "the interview would be very
inflammatory, creating unfair prejudice and may even prevent [petitioner] from receiving a fair
trial." Exhibit E.
State v. Lopes
11. On 16 March 1999 the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Lopes, 1999
UT24,980P.2dl91.
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12. In Lopes, the Utah Supreme Court found unconstitutional subsection (5)(c) of § 76-3203.1. 1999 UT 24 at If 17. That subsection allowed a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to
decide whether to impose an enhanced penalty under the section. See id.
13. However, Lopes found "the remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute
constitutional." Id. at f 20.
The Plea Affidavit
14. Mr. Brass negotiated a generous plea agreement with the State. Exhibit B.
15. Petitioner accepted the offer and entered a guilty plea on 20 October 1999. Exhibit
B.
16. The agreement required the State to reduce the charge from murder, afirstdegree
felony, to aggravated assault, a second degree felony. Exhibit B at 1, 8; Exhibit F. It also
required that if the Court sentenced petitioner to prison, the State would remain silent on a
motion to reduce the degree of the offense to a third degree felony. Exhibit B at 8; Exhibit G at
11-12.
17. In conjunction with the plea agreement, the State filed a second amended information
charging petitioner with aggravated assault, a second degree felony. Exhibit F.
18. The second amended information stated, in a separate paragraph, that "pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-203.1," petitioner would be subject to an enhanced penalty "because

the offense was committed in concert with two or more persons/'
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19. Petitioner's plea affidavit set forth the elements of petitioner's crime as, "[t]he actor
commits an assault and intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another. He does so in
concert with two or more other people." Exhibit C at 1.
20. Petitioner admitted the following facts in his plea affidavit:
"[m]y conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable,
that constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: On 31 October
1998, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I intentionally struck Bernard Repreza in the
head with a club. According to Dr. Leis, this resulted in serious bodily injury.
Immediately prior to my striking him, Jason Cunningham struck him with a baton.
We had been urged to chase and 'get him' by a third person."
Exhibit Cat 1-2.
21. In his plea affidavit, petitioner also stated "I know that if I wish to contest the charge
against me, I need only plead 'not guilty' and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State
of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt."
Exhibit Cat 3.
22. Petitioner also stated in the affidavit, "I have read this statement or I have had it read
to me by my attorney and I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct." Exhibit C at 4.
The Plea Colloquy
23. During the plea colloquy, Mr. Brass referred to petitioner's plea affidavit and stated
that he had reviewed it with petitioner and that he was certain petitioner understood it. Exhibit F
at 7.
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24. The Court asked petitioner whether he intended to plead guilty to the "second
amended information charging you with an aggravated assault with a gang enhancement/'
Exhibit F at 7-8. Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. at 8.
25. The Court questioned petitioner about his physical and mental state and reviewed
with him the constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty. Exhibit F at 8-9.
26. The Court then asked Mr. Brass to state the factual basis of the plea. Exhibit F at 910.
27. The Court also stated, "obviously the factual statement will include each and every
element of the offense as charged." Exhibit F at 10. Mr. Brass replied, "It does." Id.
28. Mr. Brass then read, verbatim, the factual basis as admitted by petitioner in the plea
affidavit. Exhibit F at 10.
29. The Court then inquired of petitioner whether those facts were true. Exhibit F at 11.
Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id.
30. Thereafter, the Court asked, "by admitting and pleading guilty to the charge . ..
you're admitting each and every element of the offense. Do you understand that?" Exhibit F at
11. Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id.
31. Petitioner also stated that he understood that the maximum sentence that could be
imposed was six-to-fifteen years. Exhibit F at 11.
32. Petitioner pled guilty to having committed an aggravated assault while acting in
concert with two or more persons. Exhibit B at 1; Exhibit G at 7-8; 10-11; 14-15.
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33. Based on petitioner's admissions in his plea affidavit and dunng the colloquy, the
Court specifically found that "this charge was done in connection with two or more persons/1
and "therefore, the gang enhancement is appropriate." Exhibit G at 14-15.
34. The Court accepted petitioner's plea, finding that he entered it "freely, voluntarily
and knowingly." Exhibit G at 15.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Regarding the Sentencing Enhancement
35. Following petitioner's plea, the Court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the sentencing enhancement. Exhibit B.
36. The findings state that petitioner "admitted facts in support of the plea including that
he acted in concert with two other persons." Exhibit B at 1.
37. The findings also state that "Defendant, Cunningham and Darger each had the mental
state required for commission of the assault on Repreza."
Sentencing
38. Petitioner requested the Court to obtain a presentence report and waived the
maximum forty-five day time period for sentencing. Exhibit G at 15-16.
39 At sentencing, Mr. Brass argued that the Court should sentence petitioner to one year
in jail and then place him on probation. Exhibit H at 7-8.
40. Mr. Brass moved the Court to reduce the category of petitioner's offense to a third
degree felony, "pursuant to 76-3-402," if the Court was inclined to commit petitioner to pnson,
Id

1

41. The Court sentenced petitioner to serve six-to-fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
Exhibit Gat 35; Exhibit I.
The Post-Conviction Petition
42. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The Court dismissed the petition
as frivolous after reviewing the ments of petitioner's claims. Moench v. State, 2002 UT App.
333 t 3, 57 P 3d 1116.
43. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions that the Court order the
Attorney General to file a response to the petition. Id. at f 14.
44. The petition asserts the following claims:
a) Mr. Brass was ineffective because he:
1) failed to move to reduce the degree of
petitioner's offense, despite his promise to do so;
2) failed to object to the imposition of a "gang
enhancement" at sentencing; and
3) failed to act in petitioner's best interest when he
encouraged petitioner to accept the plea offer, rather
than going to trial on a murder charge;
b) Petitioner's plea was not knowingly entered because he was not
informed of the elements of the "gang enhancement" or that the
State was required to prove the elements of the enhancement.
Additionally, the factual basis to support his plea to the "gang
enhancement" was insufficient.
c) The "gang enhancement" statute under which he was sentenced,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1, was unconstitutional.
d) The trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence petitioner when it
failed to impose sentence within forty-five days of the entry of his
plea.
8

Pet. at 7-8; Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 3-18.
45. On 4 March 2003 the Court held oral argument on the petition and the State's
response.
46. At oral argument, petitioner conceded that he was not entitled to relief on the
following claims:
a. that Mr. Brass was ineffective for failing to move to reduce the degree of his
offense;
b. that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce sentence.
47. Also during oral argument, Mr. Jacques stated that he was prepared to call petitioner
and petitioner's father to testify about petitioner's alleged confusion regarding the plea
proceedings.
48. The Court stated that it would be willing to hear the testimony.
49. The State objected to the Court taking evidence at the oral argument hearing because
the State had no prior notice that evidence would be taken, and was unprepared to cross-examine
petitioner's witnesses. The State also argued that the Court would need to hear the testimony of
Mr. Brass, who was not present.
50. After hearing the State's objection, the Court stated that it would not take evidence at
the oral argument hearing, but would schedule an evidentiary hearing if petitioner so desired.
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51. In presenting its argument to the Court, the State argued that the Court did not need
to take evidence because the record of petitioner's underlying criminal case conclusively refuted
petitioner's claims.
52. After hearing argument from both parties, the Court stated that it tended to agree
with the State's position and was prepared to rule based on the pleadings and arguments before
it.
53. Nevertheless, the Court also stated that it believed this was a "sensitive case," and
was therefore willing to set an evidentiary heanng to hear additional evidence if petitioner so
desired.
54. The Court then took a brief recess to allow Mr. Jacques to consult with petitioner
regarding his desire for an evidentiary hearing.
55. During the recess, the Court reviewed again State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (1999), and
the petition.
56. Following the recess, petitioner declined the Court's invitation to set the matter for
an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Jacques explained that after consulting with petitioner, they had
concluded that "it was not in petitioner's interest to have an evidentiary heanng."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims regarding Mr. Brass's alleged failure to
move to reduce his sentence, and the trial court's lack of junsdiction to pronounce sentence,
because petitioner waived those claims at oral argument.
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2. Mr. Brass was not ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the "gang
enhancement/'
a. Although petitioner claims Mr. Brass should have objected because the
enhancement was unconstitutional, Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 5-10, Lopes did not declare
the "gang enhancement" unconstitutional. See 1999 UT 24, ff 17-20. Rather, it only
declared unconstitutional the manner in which the enhancement was imposed. Id.
b. Petitioner also claims Mr. Brass should have objected to the imposition of the
enhancement because it was not properly charged as a separate offense. Mem. in Supp.
of Pet. at 5-10. Both the original and the amended information, however, clearly set forth
the enhancement-including the language that the offense be "committed in concert with
two or more persons"- in a separate paragraph. Exhibit A; Exhibit F. Moreover, it is
clear from petitioner's plea affidavit and colloquy that petitioner understood he was
pleading guilty not just to aggravated assault, but also to the separate "gang
enhancement." Exhibit C at 1-2; Exhibit G at 7-8, 10-11,13.
c. Petitioner also claims Mr. Brass should have objected to the imposition of the
enhancement because petitioner did not understand that the State would have to prove the
elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 5-10.
Again, petitioner's plea affidavit and colloquy evidence petitioner's understanding that
absent his guilty plea, the State bore the burden of proving each element of his crimeincluding the gang enhancement-bey ond a reasonable doubt. Exhibit C at 3; Exhibit G at
9,11.

11

d Petitioner claims that his plea was insufficient to establish a factual basis for
imposing the enhancement because his admission could not establish the culpability of
those with whom he acted in concert. Mem. in Supp of Pet at 11 Petitioner's plea,
however, admitted the elements of the enhancement and relieved the State of its burden
to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt Lopes acknowledges that, just as
with any crime, a valid guilty plea to the elements of the "gang enhancement" is
sufficient See 1999 UT 24 at f 17 Lopes states that "absent waiver, only a jury has the
ability to determine when the elements of a cnme are established beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id (emphasis added). The Lopes Court was also careful to explain that they
could properly consider the constitutionality of the imposition of the enhancement only
because Lopes had not admitted the elements of the "gang enhancement" in entering his
conditional guilty plea. Id at J 4 n 3 In petitioner's case, his plea affidavit specifically
referenced "[his] conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminal
liable " Exhibit C at 1 (emphasis added) He also admitted that he acted in concert with
two or more persons. Exhibit B at 2; Exhibit C at 1-2, Exhibit G at 7 8, 10-11, 13, 14-15
These admissions were sufficient to prove the elements of the "gang enhancement"
beyond a reasonable doubt.
3 Mr Brass was not ineffective for encouraging petitioner to accept the plea offer
Mem in Supp of Pet at 3-4 Petitioner claims that Mr Brass should have encouraged him to
stand tnal on the murder charge, rather than accepting the plea offer, because petitioner likely
would have acquitted of murder, just as Darger later was Id This claim is precisely the type of
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hindsight, second-guessing that the Unites States Supreme Court prohibited in Strickland v
Washington, 466 U S 668, 689 (1984) By accepting the plea offer, petitioner obtained
substantial benefits and avoided significant risks. Evaluating Mr Brass's performance at the
time of the plea, it is clear that Mr Brass's advice to accept the plea offer did not "f[a]ll below an
objective standard of reasonableness." See id at 688 In any event, even if Mr Brass could and
should have considered the subsequent outcome of Darger's case, Mr Brass's advice was still
reasonable because Darger was not equally, or more culpable than petitioner
4 In addition to alleging that Mr. Brass was ineffective for failing to object to his
allegedly invalid plea, petitioner also challenges the validity of his guilty plea directly Mem in
Supp of Pet at 10-12 These claims fail for the same reasons that petitioner's ineffective
assistance claims fail As explained above, the record of petitioner's plea conclusively
establishes that his plea to both the aggravated assault and the "gang enhancement" was
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Furthermore, the "gang enhancement" was not
unconstitutional
5 Even if the record of petitioner's plea did not conclusively resolve petitioner's claims,
his claims would nevertheless fail for lack of proof Petitioner bears the burden of establishing
that he is entitled to post-conviction relief See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-105 The Court gave
petitioner the opportunity to present additional evidence to support his claims Petitioner waived
that opportunity Consequently, even if the underlying criminal record did not conclusively
establish the validity of petitioner's plea and the effectiveness of his counsel, petitioner failed to
satisfy his burden of proof
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ORDER
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That the petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is DENIED.

31day of March, 2003.

DATED this ^ '

BY THE COURT:

Judge William W. Barrett
Judge
Third Judicial District Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Bruce A. Jacques
Counsel for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 14 March 2003 I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, to Bruce A. Jacques, 859 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B, South Jordan, UT
840905, and further certify that as of 25 March 2003 I have received no response.

Christopher D. Ballard
Counsel for Respondent
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